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EU ExtERnaL REPREsEntation and tHE intERnationaL 
LaW Commission: an inCREasinGLy siGnifiCant 
intERnationaL RoLE foR tHE EURoPEan Union?
Scarlett McArdle and Paul James Cardwell
1. INTRODUCTION
The desire on the part of the EU to establish itself as an international actor 
stretches back to the very early days of the European integration process.1 In 
economic terms, the international role of the Union has always been significant, 
not least because of the effect of its internal policies – particularly towards the 
completion of the Single Market – on the outside world. It was only later that 
the Union began to explore the possibilities for a ‘political’ foreign policy at the 
European level: firstly through the development of European Political Coop-
eration (EPC) and most notably the establishment of the Common foreign and 
Security Policy (CfSP) in the Treaty on European Union (1992). Recent chang-
es brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon have attempted to improve coher-
ency in the Union’s external policies, which are not restricted to the CfSP and 
external trade policies (particularly the Common Commercial Policy) but which 
have diversified across a great number of policy fields. The Treaties now con-
tain, for example, general provisions on external action of the Union, thus 
creating a general basis for such external action, as well as further provisions 
on cooperation and coherency on international actions between the Union and 
Member States.2 Needless to say, the Member States have resisted the pool-
ing of sovereignty in the field of political external representation to a much 
larger extent than many other dimensions of European integration. While the 
external economic activities of the Union were widely accepted from early on, 
early attempts to develop cooperation in the field of defence and foreign policy 
quickly faltered.3
The contribution of the EU to the development of international law remains, 
however, rather paradoxical. As an actor, the EU arguably has more power and 
influence than most States around the world. It is the world’s most developed 
regional integration entity. It is also, however, a creature of international law 
and following the basic and original idea of an international organisation – most 
notably the UN organs – it relies on its Member States to represent it. The 
development on modern international law, as well as the UN system, pre-
1 Arts 21, 34 and 35 Treaty of the European Union. 
2 Arts.21, 34 and 35 Treaty of the European Union. 
3 Arts.206-207 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union; Case 8/75 Hauptzollamt 
Bremerhaven v Massey Fergusson Gmbh [1973] ECR 897 at para.4; Opinion 1/75 (re OECD 
Local Cost Standard) [1975] ECR 1355; P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law Oxford: 
hart, 2006, 383-387.
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dated the European integration process by only a few years, but the anchoring 
of the international system of the Westphalian order of States appears at time 
to be set in stone.
This paper examines the external representation of the European Union 
within a specific body of the UN, namely the International Law Commission 
(ILC). This is one of the longest established bodies of the United Nations. It 
was created by a General Assembly Resolution in 19474 and the first article of 
its founding Statute accompanying the Resolution states that it ‘shall have for 
its object the promotion of the progressive development of international law 
and its codification’. The ILC has followed the traditional concept of interna-
tional law and only included States as significant actors. This paper examines 
the work of the ILC – and the extent to which the EU has succeeded in repre-
senting itself in its own right – through the prism of the development of inter-
national law on responsibility of international organisations. The ILC began its 
project on the responsibility of international organisations in 2002, before the 
conclusion and implementation of Lisbon, and concluded it in August 2011, 
after the changes of Lisbon came into force. 
The paper uses the example of the ILC’s project on responsibility to argue, 
firstly, that the EU (by which in this context primarily means the Commission) 
is evolving to possess a separate role and identity to exert at the international 
level and, secondly, that this is a role that is progressively being taken more 
seriously by actors and institutions which have traditionally been resistant to 
the influence of non-State actors. This paper considers the long-term develop-
ment of the external representation of the EU. The paper examines a particu-
lar provision of the work of the ILC, namely the lex specialis principle and how 
and why this principle was incorporated. It uses the reports of the Special Rap-
porteur and the Drafting Committee to consider the reasons behind the inclusion 
of this principle, and any changes to it. It also looks at the comments of the 
European Commission on the work of the ILC generally, as well as this provi-
sion in particular. While Lisbon, and the new mechanisms it has created, will 
should enable more effective external representation, the incremental changes 
in the EU’s representation are brought the fore here. 
The paper begins with a brief examination of the ILC and its work. It then 
undertakes an examination of the key lex specialis provision within the project 
of the ILC, and the contributions made by the EU and its Member States. As 
this is a project that focuses upon the way in which the EU represented itself 
prior to the changes brought in by the Lisbon Treaty, the paper concludes with 
some thoughts on how the changes brought about by Lisbon may change and 
improve the ability of the EU to pursue an autonomous role at the interna-
tional level. In the concluding section, the paper argues that the EU has moved 
beyond an existence as a close coalition of States and continues to progress 
towards as an independent actor. Although this may suggest either a replace-
ment of the role of the Member States in international arenas, or the emergence 
of rivalries and incoherence between the Member States and the EU, it is 
4 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution: Establishment of an International Law Com-
mission, A/RES/174 (II) of 21 November 1947.
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contended here that a ‘middle way’ has been found. Although the views of the 
EU as an independent actor and the Member States may on occasion differ, 
the latter are (at least in general sense) supportive of the progression towards 
the EU becoming more significant as an international actor. In the area sur-
rounding the ILC, at least, there has been a general acceptance of the EU 
voicing its opinions and in contributing to and helping to shape the development 
of international legal principles.
2. ThE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S PROJECT ON ThE 
RESPONSIBILITY Of INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
The International Law Commission (ILC) is one of the longest established bod-
ies within the UN system. It was established by a Resolution of the General 
Assembly in 1947 and held its first session in 1949.5 Much of international law 
originally had to be sought out in the form of customary principles. A number 
of ad hoc attempts at codification were made in the nineteenth century through 
the holding of conferences.6 This was relatively limited, however, and while 
there was some attempt at codification made under the League of Nations, 
there was nothing comprehensive.7 In the early days of the ILC’s work, account 
had to be taken of (generally) unwritten principles which had developed over 
time, according to State practice accompanied by opinion juris, a concept mean-
ing that the practice is believed to be law. The establishment of the ILC thus 
signified a break from the past by a desire to work towards a codified, compre-
hensive version of law applying between States. The establishment of the ILC 
drew on the various previous attempts at codification of principles, which had 
occurred in isolation at different congresses and conferences.8 
One of the key challenges facing the ILC was that of establishing rules on 
international legal responsibility. This is a topic which had been on the agenda 
of an early attempt at codification with the Conference of the League of Nations 
in 1930, but proved too sensitive.9 The establishment of the ILC saw a revival 
of the questions surrounding this topic and it was included on the initial list of 
fourteen subjects for codification, adopted at the ILC’s first session in 1949.10 
5 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution: Establishment of an International Law Com-
mission, A/RES/174 (II) of 21 November 1947; Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its first Session, 12 April 1949, Official Records of the General Assembly, fourth Session, 
Supplement No. 10, Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1949, vol.I.
6 UN Documents on the Development and Codification of International Law, Supplement to 
the American Journal of International Law Vol.41, No.8, Oct.1947, 32-49.
7 Ibid, 49-61.
8 United Nations Documents concerning the Development and Codification of International 
Law, Supplement to American Journal of International Law,41(4), October 1947; final Act of the 
International Peace Conference. The Hague, 29 July 1899; final Act of the Second Peace Con-
ference, The Hague, 18 October 1907.
9 A. Pellet, ‘The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and 
Related Texts’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson (eds.) The Law of International Responsi-
bility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, at 75.
10 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its first Session, 12 April 1949, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, fourth Session, Supplement No. 10, Extract from the 
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Initial considerations of the area did not really begin until 1955 and continued 
through five Special Rapporteurs until 1996 when a first draft of articles was 
adopted.11 finally on 31 May 2001 a second, and final, reading of 59 draft 
articles took place and the ILC adopted the complete set of 59 draft articles on 
the ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’.12 Unsurpris-
ingly, the focus of the ILC’s work remained on the responsibility of States as 
the primary actors at the international level.13 The ILC may have made refer-
ence to the idea of the responsibility of international organisations within the 
articles on State responsibility, but it was clear that this was not to be addressed 
in any detail. States were the actors with which the ILC was concerned. After 
completing of a set of principles in relation to States, the ILC turned to other 
international actors that require consideration in this area; international or-
ganisations. The growth in the powers and activities of international organisa-
tions had led to concerns about potential breaches of international law and the 
ILC began considering how principles of responsibility might, and how they 
could, apply to such entities.14 It is this project which forms the basis of the 
research in this paper.
A significant aspect to the work of the ILC on this project has been the in-
volvement of international organisations in the drafting process. While many 
EU Member States are often involved in voicing opinions on topics of interna-
tional law, it is less common for organisations to be involved within such an 
archetypal ‘traditional’ international body. Yet, in 2002, the ILC recommended 
that the Secretariat approach international organisations for their contributions 
on the topic being considered.15 Consequently, letters were sent to various 
international organisations between September and October 2003 asking for 
their comments and materials that related to the topic.
This interaction and involvement of organisations continued throughout the 
work of the ILC, until the final comments were received in early 2011, shortly 
before the draft articles were adopted by the ILC on second reading in August 
2011 (Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations 
(DARIO)).16 The articles detail the basic requirement for responsibility as being 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1949, vol.I, para. 16, at 281.
11 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly covering the work 
of its seventh session, 2 May-8 July 1955, Doc. A/2934, para.33, at 42; UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.528/
Add.3; Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-
26 July 1996) A/51/10, at 57-73.
12 International Law Commission Report of the fifty-third Session 2001, Doc. A/56/10, paras. 
69-71, at 25; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution: Responsibility of States for interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, RES/56/83 of 28 January 2002.
13 Art. 57 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
14 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session 2000, 
Annex ‘Syllabuses on Topics Recommended for Inclusion in the Long-Term Programme of work 
of the Commission, at 135-136; Report of the Working Group, International Law Commission 
Report of the fifty-fourth Session (2002) Doc.A/57/10, at 228-236.
15 Report of the Working Group, International Law Commission Report of the fifty-fourth 
Session (2002) Doc.A/57/10, at para.488, 236.
16 ‘Comments and Observations by Governments and International Organizations’, 14 feb-
ruary 2011, A/CN.4/637; Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with 
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, part two.
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the existence of an internationally wrongful act that consists of a breach of 
international law that can be attributed, or traced, to the responsible entity. 
Many of the articles elaborate upon these basic ideas and start to consider the 
interaction between an organisation and its members, as this can often be 
complex and mean that the principles of attribution and breach are not so 
straightforward. The draft articles also elaborate upon these basic principles, 
looking at the scope of these principles, as well as the consequences of a find-
ing of responsibility, as well as the circumstances that would preclude any 
wrongful actions. It is the interaction between the ILC and the European Com-
mission on behalf of the EU, as well as the involvement of Member States of 
the EU that forms the basis of the discussion in this paper. 
It will be clear from the timing of the ILC’s work that the involvement of the 
EU in this project was carried out, largely, before Lisbon came into force. While 
the changes brought about by Lisbon seek to pursue a greater role for the EU 
at an international level, this project is testament to the way in which the EU 
was already developing ways in which to pursue an international role in areas 
traditionally reserved for States only. The Legal Service of the European Com-
mission has been primarily responsible for providing comments to the ILC on 
behalf of the EU. In addition, the EU Delegation to the UN has made a number 
of statements to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.17 The General 
Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the UN and the discussions it has 
and the mandates that follow largely drive the work of the UN. This committee 
of the General Assembly is where legal questions are discussed and allows all 
UN members to have representation. To make comments to this committee is 
to contribute to the shaping and development of international law.
It is perhaps significant to note that the submitted comments were identified 
as originating from the European Commission, and not from the European 
Community or the European Union. This may perhaps say something about 
the growth of the role of the European Commission within the realms of the 
Union more than about the impact of the comments on the work on the ILC. 
More relevant for the impact of such comments on the work of the ILC is the 
limitations that the Commission seemed to impose on its own comments. Such 
comments were limited to areas of action that could be considered as previ-
ously falling under the remit of the European Community; the European Com-
mission made no comments on any areas such as foreign, security or defence 
policy. This is obviously a limitation within the comments and the consideration 
of the impact of the comments on the work of the ILC and as representing the 
EU as a whole. The timing of the project was such, however, that the majority 
of the work was completed prior to Lisbon coming into force when a division 
between Community and Union still existed and the mandate of the Commis-
sion in Union matters was limited. The impact of such comments would always 
have had limitations unless the project had continued for a period of time fol-
lowing Lisbon coming into force. The impact of the comments given by the 
17 EU Presidency Statement- Report of the ILC: Responsibility of International Organizations, 
PRES06-284EN, EU Statement- United Nations 6th Committee: Report of the International Law 
Commission on Responsibility of International Organisations, EUUN11-120EN, 24/10/2011.
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European Commission will be considered, with some thoughts in the final sec-
tion on how this may change in the future or the wider impact that may be felt. 
The following section seeks to consider the ways in which the EU has voiced 
its comments alongside those of its Member States and how such comments 
were received within the ILC’s project on the responsibility of international or-
ganisations. 
3. ThE IMPACT Of ThE EU ON ThE DEVELOPMENT Of ThE LEX 
SPECIALIS PROVISION
from the very beginning of its work the ILC sought to develop a set of principles 
that were closely modelled on those developed in the project that produced 
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.18 
This has precipitated one of the strongest critiques of the DARIO; that they 
failed to take account of the different nature of organisations compared to States 
and the diversity of organisations.19 This is a critique that arose early on in the 
work of the ILC on the responsibility of international organisations and does 
not ever seem to have been fully addressed. This has been, furthermore, the 
dominant critique throughout the comments made on the work of the ILC by 
the European Commission on behalf of the European Union. 20
from its very first comments, which were among some of the first received 
by the ILC in 2003, until its final contributions made in early 2011, the Euro-
pean Commission continually emphasised the sui generis nature of the EU as 
a specific kind of international organisation.21 While the comments made by 
the Legal Service of the Commission demonstrate a clear commitment to the 
ILC’s project, and an acceptance that these are legal principles that could have 
a significant impact upon the EU, this was accompanied by a desire for the 
unique nature of the EU to be recognised. There was a clear acceptance of 
the general principles and ideas underpinning international responsibility. This 
was always accompanied, however, by the argument of the European Com-
mission for a special rule of attribution that would be better able to respond to 
the internal nature of the Union. 
18 International Law Commission Report of the fifty-fifth session (2003) A/58/10, para. 44, 
at 30.
19 E. Paasivirta and P-J Kuijper, ‘Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the Re-
sponsibility of International Organizations’, 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2005) 
p.169; N. Blokker, ‘Preparing articles on Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the 
International Law Commission take International Organizations seriously? A mid-term review’, in 
J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (eds.) Research Handbook on the Law of international Organiza-
tions , Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, p.313, at, p.337.
20 Responsibility of International Organizations Comments and Observations Received from 
international organizations, 25 June 2004, A/CN.4/545, ‘Comments of the European Commis-
sion’, p.5; Responsibility of International Organizations Comments and Observations Received 
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Much of this insistence on individual treatment commensurate with the sui 
generis nature of the EU was focused around the question of attribution.22 This 
principle forms one of the basic requirements for the finding of responsibility. 
While one requirement is the existence of a breach of international law, there 
is a second foundational principle that the breach must be ‘attributed’ to the 
responsible actor;23 namely that the action can be traced to them. When con-
sidering an organisation, the question as to what actions are those of the or-
ganisation and which are those of a Member State goes to the core of the 
organisation. While the actions and identity of a State is relatively well estab-
lished at the international level, the label ‘international organisation’ does little 
to explain the powers and capabilities of that entity. The internal nature of an 
organisation can be understood as a sub-system and it is this internal order 
that establishes the powers of an organisation as well as any division in these 
powers between the organisation and its members.24 As such, the complexity 
surrounding the question of attribution is unsurprising; it may not be so straight-
forward as to trace an action to the organisation or a Member State. The 
complex make up of the EU and the interaction between the EU and its mem-
bers raises even more questions. The Union often relies on its Member States 
to implement obligations to which it has agreed, even in areas of exclusive 
competence, leading to the question of who is actually responsible for various 
actions.25 There is also, however, a horizontal aspect to the relationship between 
the Union and the Member States, with the area of shared competence, where 
both the Union and Member States may be parties, separately, to the same 
international obligation.26 There is a constant interaction and interdependence 
between the Union and its Member States in pursuit of a greater international 
role and this complex interaction is not easily understood. The result is confu-
sion with any attempt to determine who precisely is responsible for any par-
ticular action. 
At the beginning of its comments, the EU focused upon incorporating refer-
ence to the rules of the organisation within the principles on attribution of 
conduct.27 The Commission argued that the complex relations between an 
organisation and its Member States, in particular that between the EU and its 
Member States, warranted reference to the rules of the organisation. As it is 
22 Chapter II, ‘Attribution of Conduct to an International Organization’ Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
vol. II, Part Two (2011); Comments of the European Commission ‘Comments and Observations 
Received from international organizations’, 25 June 2004, A/CN.4/545, at 13; Comments of the 
European Commission, ‘Comments and Observations by Governments and International Organi-
zations’, 12 May 2005, A/CN.4/556, at 5-6.
23 Art. 4 DARIO
24 C. Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law. International Organisations 
and the Law of Treaties, Oxford: hart, 2007, 27-29
25 P.J. Kuijper and E. Paasivirta, ‘further Exploring International Responsibility: The Euro-
pean Community and the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of International Organizations’ 1 Interna-
tional Organizations Law Review (2004) at 123-132.
26 Ibid at 116-123.
27 Comments of the European Commission ‘Comments and Observations Received from in-
ternational organizations’, 25 June 2004, A/CN.4/545, at 13.
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the rules of the organisation that establish how obligations are divided between 
an organisation and its members, they must be referred to in order to establish 
whether a breach is that of the organisation or of one, or indeed several, Mem-
ber States.28 Before responsibility can be established, it must be clear whose 
obligation was in fact the subject of the breach. This can surely only be done 
by reference to the rules of the organisation, as it is only these rules which 
determine to whom different obligations belong. The European Commission 
consistently sought to claim a link between apportionment of obligations and 
the division of responsibility. It has argued that there must be a determination 
of the apportionment of obligations before any consideration of attribution can 
take place. If the breach in question was not in fact a breach of an obligation 
of the organisation, then there can be no attribution of conduct, nor yet any 
responsibility.29 The European Commission is clear in this argument that the 
rules of the organisation must play a key role in determining the question of 
attribution, but also the question of apportionment of obligations. The latter 
question is, in fact, the primary concern and must be addressed prior to any 
consideration of attribution.30
With the division of competence between the EU and its Member States 
being so fluid and developmental – especially given the context of the ongoing 
processes of Treaty reform within the EU during the 2000s – the European 
Commission has argued that reference to the internal rules of the organisation 
are crucial for addressing attribution.31 It has also put forward three possible 
solutions to the question of attribution.32 These are, firstly, a special rule of at-
tribution so that the actions of organs of Member States can be attributed to 
organisations. An example of this with the EU is with the tariff agreements 
contracted between the EU and third States. It is not organs of the EU that are 
charged with implementing these, but rather the customs authorities of Member 
States. The European Commission considers this to show a ‘separation between 
responsibility and attribution’.33 With the traditional idea of attribution, actions 
would be attributed to the Member States, when the responsibility should re-
ally lie at the EU level. The second possibility was the implementation of spe-
cial rules of responsibility to enable responsibility to be placed with the 
organisation, even if the prime actors in the breach of the organisations obliga-
tion were the organs of Member States.34 The final option put forward was a 
special exemption or savings clause for the EU, which was, in fact, least fa-
voured by the European Commission.35 It seemingly did not want to go too far 
in its attempts to recognise the individuality of the EU. It was clear that this 
28 Comments of the European Commission ‘Comments and Observations Received from in-
ternational organizations’, 25 June 2004, A/CN.4/545, at 13.
29 Ibid. at 13-14.
30 Ibid. at 14.
31 Ibid. at 13.
32 Comments of the European Commission, ‘Comments and Observations by Governments 
and International Organizations’, 12 May 2005, A/CN.4/556, at 6.
33 Ibid. at 6.
34 Ibid. at 6.
35 Ibid. at 5.
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would not be recognised and perhaps would detract from the growing desire 
of the EU to pursue a role within an ‘effective multilateral’ international com-
munity. The ILC was originally not keen to establish such an exemption clause. 
The Special Rapporteur considered that it would be possible to draft a gen-
eral rule attributing actions that implemented binding acts of an organisation 
to that organisation.36 While the ILC was, furthermore, not sure on the existence 
of a special rule of attribution,37 the idea of a general lex specialis provision 
was first voiced within the reports of the Special Rapporteur in 2007, before 
being incorporated into the draft articles in 2009. The lex specialis provision is 
contained with Article 64 of DARIO and states:
‘These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the ex-
istence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the 
international organization, or a State in connection with the conduct of an interna-
tional organization, are governed by special rules of international law. Such special 
rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization appli-
cable to the relations between an international organization and its members.’
The principle is modelled on article 55 of the articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and is designed so that continued 
reference to ‘special rules’ throughout the articles is not necessary.38 It basi-
cally follows the international law maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali 
which considers that where more specialised legal provisions exist, they will 
take precedence over general legal principles.39 
The inclusion of this principle is able to show two significant developments 
in the external identity of the EU. The first of which is the way in which the 
opinions of the EU on this show a distinct view on behalf of the European Un-
ion and move away from any consideration of the EU simply voicing the opin-
ions of a collection of States. The second of these developments is the influence 
that the comments of the EU had. These are comments that were distinctly 
those of the EU, and furthermore, they were responded to, showing an actual 
influence of the EU in the development of international law. The following sec-
tion explores this claim in more detail.
4. ThE ILC AND LEX SPECIALIS: A RESULT Of EU OPINION?
The lex specialis principle within the work on the responsibility of international 
organisations is actually relatively new. The first mention of this idea arose in 
the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur, Giorgio Gaja, in 2007. he recognised 
36 Seventh Report on the Responsibility of international Organisations by Giorgio Gaja, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, A/CN.4/610, at 12.
37 Seventh Report on the Responsibility of international Organisations by Giorgio Gaja, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, A/CN.4/610, at 38-39.
38 Commentary to Draft Article 64 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi-
zations, para. 7, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2011, vol. II, Part Two.
39 fifth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations 2007, A/CN.4/583, para. 7, 
at 4.
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the continued critique of the articles being made in comments, such as those 
from the European Commission, but also more generally in academic literature, 
that they did not sufficiently consider the variety of international organisations.40 
Gaja reasoned, however, that the fact that not all articles would be relevant 
and apply to all organisations did not preclude these general provisions from 
being included in the draft. It was not necessary that all articles would have to 
apply to all organisations. he did consider, however, that particular features of 
certain organisations might affect the application of certain rules.41 Gaja con-
sidered there to clearly exist special rules in certain situations that warranted 
the ability to make reference to them and deviate from the general regime be-
ing drafted by the ILC.42 The Rapporteur considered that the inclusion of refer-
ence to the possibility of specialised rules in this lex specialis provision would 
respond to the critique that the draft articles take insufficient account of the 
variety of organisations.43 
Only one real change to this article was made by the ILC Drafting Commit-
tee from its first inclusion to the final set of articles adopted on second reading 
by the ILC. This change was to replace the phrase ‘such as the rules of the 
organization’ with that of ‘including the rules of the organisation’.44 The reason-
ing behind this proposal furthermore reinforces the reasons behind its original 
inclusion’ to emphasise the diversity of organisations and the need to apply the 
articles in a flexible way.45 It was felt by the Drafting Committee that there 
needed to be a greater emphasis on the specific characteristics of each or-
ganisation and so a greater reference on the rules of the organisation as form-
ing a substantial part of the potential lex specialis that this article refers to.46
It is clear to see from Gaja’s statements that the very reason for the inclusion 
of this principle was that of the peculiarities of different international organisa-
tions needing to be taken into account. The arguments made from 2004 onwards 
40 fifth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations 2007, A/CN.4/583, para. 7, at 
4, See Comments of the European Commission ‘Comments and Observations Received from 
international organizations’, 25 June 2004, A/CN.4/545, at 5; ‘Comments of the International Mon-
etary fund’, at 7; N. Blokker, ‘Preparing articles on Responsibility of International Organizations: 
Does the International Law Commission take International Organizations seriously? A mid-term 
review’, in J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (eds.) Research Handbook on the Law of international 
Organizations, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, at 321; See also P-J Kuijper, ‘Introduction to 
the symposium on Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) states: Attrib-
uted or Direct Responsibility or Both?’ 7 International Organizations Law Review (2010) p.9; N. 
Blokker, ‘Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Article 16 of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organizations’ 7 International Organizations Law Review (2010) 
p.35; A. Reinisch ‘Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control between states and International 
Organizations in the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 7 International Organizations 
Law Review (2010) p.63
41 fifth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations2007, A/CN.4/583, para. 7, 
at 4.
42 Ibid. para. 7, at 4.
43 Ibid. para.7, at 4.
44 Statement of Drafting Committee, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee 
Mr. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez, 6 July 2009, at 6.
45 Ibid. at 7.
46 Ibid. at 7.
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by the European Commission seem to precipitate the reasoning of the ILC. 
The Commission has been claiming the importance of the rules of the organi-
sation, in particular in the area of attribution since its very first involvement in 
the ILC project. The Special Rapporteur seemed to almost respond to this by 
his inclusion of the lex specialis principle. It has been included to address the 
difficulty of there existing such a variety of organisations. While this certainly 
has not satisfied the EU in all of its claims, it has begun to incorporate the 
references to the rules of the organisations. from the final comments made by 
the European Commission on these articles, it appears as if it considers that 
even this provision does not completely address the issues of the ‘different’ 
nature of the EU:
‘for now the European Union remains unconvinced that the draft articles and the 
commentaries thereto adequately reflect the diversity of international organizations. 
Several draft articles appear either inadequate or even inapplicable to regional in-
tegration organization such as the European Union, even when account is taken of 
some of the nuances now set out in the commentaries. [...]
In view of these comments the European Commission considers that the Interna-
tional Law Commission should give further thought as to whether the draft articles 
and the commentaries, as they stand now, are apt for adoption by the Commission 
on second reading or whether further discussion and work is needed.’47
While the Commission seems to consider that these articles have not gone far 
enough, the development of a greater inclusion and focus on the rules of the 
organisation has gone some way towards recognising the individual nature of 
the EU. It was not the special rule on attribution requested by the European 
Commission but it was recognition of some differences. With the inclusion of 
the lex specialis principle, and its focus on the rules of the organisation, this 
moves towards recognising the individuality of the EU, without openly allowing 
or accepting individual exceptions for the EU. If any such rule were to exist and 
be codified this would perhaps remove the Union from such an international 
system of responsibility. 
The EU was not the only proponent of this critique, but it was certainly at 
the forefront of the contributors. While the critique came up in other comments 
and academic contributions, none were as strong or as focused as those from 
the EU. The need to recognise the unique nature of the EU goes to the core 
of every comment made by the European Commission on behalf of the EU. 
The commentary to article 64, furthermore, focuses entirely on the EU as an 
example. While the EU was not the only organisation to support the inclusion 
of this article, the ILC chose to focus entirely upon the EU in the commentary. 
The ILC considers it impossible to identify all potential rules that may be incor-
porated under this category of lex specialis and so uses the example of the 
potential existence of a special rule on attribution to the European Union of 
47 Comments of the European Commission, Comments and observations received from inter-
national Organizations, 14 february 2011, Doc. A.CN.4/637, at 8.
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conduct of Member States when implementing binding acts of the Union.48 The 
potential existence of this special rule is a question that has continually arisen 
since this question of responsibility began.49 It has become a complex question, 
which is certainly not settled. There are a number of different factors that com-
plicate the matter, not least the changing and fluid competences of the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States. 
The overall approach of the ILC has been to mirror the articles on those 
developed in relation to States and to, at certain points, attempt to come up 
with certain exceptions, such as this lex specialis provision. The way in which 
the ILC has incorporated so many references to the rules of the organisation, 
as the European Commission has been claiming that it should include, shows 
a reaction to these comments. The inclusion of the EU’s comments in the final 
draft of the articles – and the initial instigation of a project on responsibility of 
non-State actors – perhaps demonstrates a growing respect towards the EU 
as a global actor. At the very least, it shows a recognition that the EU is able 
to voice opinions in its own right and is gaining an identity that is greater than 
simply a grouping of States. 
5. ThE EU AS MORE ThAN ThE SUM Of ITS MEMBER STATE-PARTS?
The Commission and its Legal Service made the various contributions of the 
EU towards the work of the ILC. from an institutional perspective, and consid-
ering the mechanisms available prior to those brought in by Lisbon, it is inter-
esting that it was this part of the EU that took on representing this external 
identity of the Union here. While in some areas, for example with various ac-
tions under the Common foreign and Security Policy, it has been the Presi-
dency, high Representative or the Council that has taken on voicing the 
opinion of the EU, here it was the one institution that could be said to be acting 
solely on behalf of the Union. The actions of the Commission could not be 
mistaken to be those of the Member States as a collective, but will be those of 
the Union. In this sense, the external representation by the Commission of the 
EU as a whole resembles the role the Commission had in terms of the delega-
tions of the Commission in third countries (before Lisbon) – cooperation with 
Member States, but certainly not acting under mandates from them.
48 Commentary to Draft Article 64 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi-
zations, para.1, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part Two, (2011).
49 E. Paasivirta and P. J. Kuijper, ‘Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the 
Responsibility of International Organizations’, 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
(2005) at 169; f. hoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the European Union and Its Member States 
– Who Responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?’ 21 European Journal of International Law (2010) at 723; S. Talmon ‘Responsibil-
ity of International Organizations: Does the European Community require Special Treatment?’ in 
M. Ragazzi (ed.) International Responsibility Today, Leiden: Brill, 2005, at 405.
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Comments were made by fourteen States in total, of which eight are Mem-
ber States of the EU.50 Thus, even though only some EU Member States 
submitted comments, there was more involvement from EU members than 
from non-members in the process. This inevitably leads to the question as to 
whether there is any synergy between the comments made by the Commission 
and the EU Member States. first and foremost, it can be said that no such 
conflict between the comments of the Member States of the European Union 
and those of the Commission can really be seen. Member States have not 
been seen to openly critique the position of the Commission. This is not to say 
that there has been complete agreement and that all comments between the 
Union and its Members have been the same or come to the same conclusions. 
It is significant, however, that there has been no critique from either side of the 
position from the other side and also that even where differences of opinion 
have arisen, these differences have been possible without conflict arising. This 
reinforces the nature of the role of the EU in this arena as that of the Union 
alone; the Member States will not openly conflict or interfere with the views put 
across because they are the views of a separate international actor and the 
Member States is able to voice their own opinions on matters. 
This can be seen, for example, with the Belgian comments on the last draft 
of the lex specialis principle. Belgium considered this principle to be too broad 
and capable of opening up too widely the possibility of organisations evading 
any responsibility and “as it stands [it] could render the draft articles entirely 
pointless.”51 This is in contrast to the opinion of the Commission, which is 
generally supportive of the principle. The Commission considers that the articles 
are insufficient in considering the situations of the EU and of similar entities 
that may be termed regional economic integration organisations.52 As such the 
lex specialis principle is seen as “particularly important [...] to explicitly allow 
for the hypothesis that not all of [the draft articles] can be applied to regional 
(economic) integration organisations.”53 It appears that while some States, 
including Belgium, see this provision as too broad and needing to be deleted 
or at the very least limited in scope, the European Commission views this as 
a compromise and not one that truly goes far enough in addressing the issues 
that arise with the EU.
The comments of the Commission, in fact, consider this principle to be a 
way in which the individual characteristics of organisations, but most particu-
larly the unique nature of the EU can be taken into account. While this is a 
difference in opinion between the EU and one of its Member States, there has 
been no conflict or fallout from this. Both are able to express these views, as 
50 EU Member States: Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Netherlands, 
Italy and Poland; Other States: Cuba, El Salvador, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo. 
51 Belgium comments, Comments and Observations received from Governments, 14 febru-
ary 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/636, at 41.
52 Comments of the European Commission, Comments and observations received from inter-
national Organizations, 14 february 2011, Doc. A.CN.4/637, at 38.
53 Comments of the European Commission, Comments and observations received from inter-
national Organizations, 14 february 2011, Doc. A.CN.4/637, at 38.
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equal participants within this drafting process. This may not show coordination 
between the EU and its Member States, but it does show something just as 
significant; the growth of the EU beyond a collection of Member States capable 
of expressing its own distinct views. 
There does also, however, exist coordination between the EU and some of 
its Member States. The comments on this principle from Germany are gener-
ally supportive of the principles in terms similar to those used by the Commis-
sion. Germany considered the draft articles adopted on first position to ‘fall 
short of fully reflecting’ the fact that ’the relationship between an international 
organization and its Member States is [...] exclusively governed by the internal 
rules of that organization.’54 Germany views the inclusion of the lex specialis 
as a way of enabling ‘interpretation on a case-by-case basis’ to compensate 
for the lack of understanding of the importance played by the relationship be-
tween an organisation and its Member States.55 Germany also makes reference 
to these ideas in comments on other articles. Germany considers the relation-
ship between an organisation between an organisation and its members to be 
so fundamentally different to that between States as, while the latter is governed 
by general international law, the former, ‘is created by [the members’] wilful 
act’.56 Germany goes as far as to consider there to be ‘simply no room to resort 
to general international law, apart from specific indications to the contrary’57 as 
any questions surrounding breaches of members’ obligations towards the or-
ganisation are solely an internal question for that organisation:
‘It is hence for an organization’s members to stipulate and precisely define the rela-
tionship between them and the newly created international legal entity, including the 
legal powers an international organization may resort to, should one of its members 
breach an existing obligation vis-á-vis the organization.’58
Germany seems to be aligning its opinions here with those considered by the 
European Commission both in terms of the general importance of the internal 
relationship of the organisation, as well as the importance of the lex specialis 
provision in responding to this issue. There is support for the EU voicing its 
own distinct voice but these comments from Germany also show support and 
coordination from a Member State of the EU for the approach taken by the EU 
towards these issues. 
6. POST-LISBON EVOLUTION?
The European Commission has clearly managed to carve a significant role for 
itself within the project of the ILC. It has done so by utilising the institutions and 
54 Germany comments, Comments and Observations received from Governments, 14th feb-
ruary 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/636, at 41.
55 Ibid. at 41.
56 Ibid. at 22.
57 Ibid. at 22.
58 Ibid. at 22.
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mechanisms already in existence prior to Lisbon to pursue this external repre-
sentative role on behalf of the EU. The work of the ILC was not completed 
until after the implementation of Lisbon, though the contributions of the EU 
remained largely unaffected by any of the changes. Even the interventions 
made to the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly have remained large-
ly the same in terms of content. A difference can be seen in who such comments 
are attributed to, with pre-Lisbon there being ‘European Community Statements’ 
or ‘EU Presidency Statements’ and after Lisbon there being only ‘EU State-
ments’ but the content in these statements is consistent. An interesting aspect 
to the statements made before this body is perhaps the final ‘EU Statement’ 
being made by the Principal Legal Advisor to the Commission. Despite having 
established a number of new mechanisms and institutions for the purpose of 
external action, the Commission Legal Service retained the capacity to make 
statements and has retained a significant role in the EU Delegation at the UN. 
The question does remain as to how the changes brought in by Lisbon may 
affect such a role. 
With one of the main aims behind Lisbon being the promotion of a greater 
global identity for the EU,59 the growth of the role of the European Commission 
has begun the move towards this increased international role. The EU has 
developed a role for itself distinct from its Member States in the ILC’s project 
on responsibility and the very fact that there was a need to consider the re-
sponsibility of international organisations demonstrates the importance of legal 
consequences resulting from the EU’s external activities. The question of the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States is one that goes to the core 
of the difficulty of the external representation of the EU; the complexity of the 
interaction between the EU and its Member States. The EU seemed to achieve 
this impact by acting through existing institutions that could be viewed as dis-
tinctly ‘European’, namely the Commission and the EU Delegation to the UN 
(which was part of the Commission prior to the establishment of the European 
External Action Service). 
The changes brought in by Lisbon have the potential to have a significant 
impact on the external identity of the Union and enable it to set itself apart from 
its Member States. There are three main ways in which such a potential impact 
arises; the establishing of a ‘single’ European Union with explicit legal person-
ality, the new institutional roles that have been created and the greater devel-
opment of obligations on Member States to cooperate and support Union 
external positions and policies. While all of these changes are potentially pos-
itive for the further progression of the Union, their actual impact is, as yet, 
uncertain and a number of challenges do still remain. 
The creation of a single European Union with explicitly conferred legal per-
sonality (Article 47 TEU) has significant external impact. Prior to Lisbon, only 
the European Community had legal personality conferred upon it. While there 
does remain a simultaneous dependence on and independence from its Mem-
ber States, the development of the EU into a single entity rather than a number 
59 Preamble, Art.3(5), Art.21 Treaty of the European Union.
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of disparate ones does create a more certain identity. The definitive answer to 
the long debated question on the legal personality of the EU also shows it as 
an international actor and as capable of acting of its own accord without its 
Member States. The single legal personality allows the conclusion of interna-
tional agreements under the name of the Union. It is debatable whether there 
are any formal, legal consequences of the change. What is clear, however, is 
that the new Article 47 will prevent the disjointed approach that arose on oc-
casion. The most obvious example of this was in the relationship between the 
European Community and the (non-UN) international organisations which it 
was a member of, primarily the World Trade Organization. While it was clear 
what the involvement of the European Community was for a long time, the 
consequences for the European Union were for some time uncertain. Now that 
such a clear statement has been made on the part of the EU in terms of its 
international identity, there remain some questions about what this will truly 
mean in practical terms. It may raise a number of questions yet, as the exist-
ence of personality of the Union, while not controversial in its basic idea, does 
not affect the complex nature of the Union and the continued strong involve-
ment of the Member States in the actions of the Union. It is now clear that the 
EU has the potential to act as an international legal person, if this was ever in 
question, but when actions will be considered to be those of the Union and 
when they will be those of the Member States is something that will remain a 
difficult subject.
Lisbon has furthered this theme of consistency and solidarity beyond the 
creation of a single legal entity and has strengthened many provisions previ-
ously within the Treaties to create a greater undertaking on Member States to 
coordinate their positions externally and to support the EU. There is, most vis-
ibly, an obligation to coordinate actions and positions within international or-
ganisations and conferences, as well as supporting the position of the Union 
in these forums.60 Of course, the aim of this provision is to ensure consistency 
across the Union’s actions and not only between the EU and the Member 
States. As well as this, there now also exists an obligation on Member States 
of consultation and ‘convergence of [...] actions’ in the area of foreign and 
security policy.61 Not only is the EU put forward as an entity capable of inter-
national action, but the greater obligations of Member States exist to promote 
a significant and coherent international actor. This is perhaps one of the most 
significant developments in pursuing an international role for the EU. A clear 
desire can be seen to gain a coherent international approach on the part of the 
EU and identify itself, and its policies, at the international level. The challenge 
that remains, however, is how this will work in practice. With clear examples of 
diverging approaches from Member States towards international crises, such 
as during the break-up of Yugoslavia and the conflict in Iraq, along with the 
sensitive nature of foreign policy, raises the question of politically, how such 
coherence can be achieved. It remains to be seen how much things will change 
60 Art. 34 Treaty of the European Union.
61 Art. 32 Treaty of the European Union.
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through legal requirements on Member States to act consistently with Euro-
pean Union policy.
Article 3(5) TEU also now lists the development of international law as an 
objective of the Union. The work of the European Commission shows that this 
commitment began prior to Lisbon. Perhaps the inclusion of this with the Trea-
ties shows this as action that will be increasingly pursued by the Union as a 
whole. It may have been the Commission under a limited mandate that involved 
itself in this project. With this increased commitment, it is arguable that perhaps 
a more comprehensive approach from the Union may be seen in the progres-
sive development of international legal principles. This may be the signal of 
increased involvement of the EU within projects such as these. The Commis-
sion may have had some influence on principles here, but these were principles 
that had the potential to significantly impact upon the EU. It may be interesting 
to see how this obligation towards the development of international law is 
pursued by the EU. It may be, for example, that a broader approach is taken 
towards the areas over which it seeks to exert an influence. This may further-
more indicate a role for one of the newer institutional mechanisms that could 
be said to represent the Union as a whole. The actions of the European Com-
mission here could be seen to have laid the foundations upon which this new 
obligation can now be pursued; the Commission has already paved a way 
towards influencing and enabling the development of international law. 
On the institutional front, the introduction of the high Representative for 
foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the ‘permanent’ President of the European 
Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS) enable actions to 
be seen as solely ‘European’ and create a clearer distinction between action 
of the Member States and that of the EU. These three new institutional aspects 
to the EU all contribute to one of the overriding aims of Lisbon; to create clar-
ity and consistency in the global role of the EU. The various roles of the high 
Representative as Vice President of the Commission, Chair of the foreign Af-
fairs Council and representing the Union on matters of foreign and security 
policy pursue this by making a role that has responsibility for this idea of con-
sistency across different areas of external relations. The EEAS has furthermore 
been created to assist and enable this role to be fulfilled sufficiently. 
The Union has created entities that can clearly identify themselves interna-
tionally as acting on behalf of the EU and can work towards developing this as 
a significant role and one which is taken seriously by other international actors. 
These are institutions, however, that are unique to the Union and the precise 
capabilities of such actors are likely only to become clear after some experi-
ence. The role of such entities is uncertain, for example, as compared to the 
Commission and its Legal Service, and the role that it developed within the 
International Law Commission. The European Commission has gradually de-
veloped more involvement at the international level but the meaning of such a 
role, now that there are more dedicated international actors is unclear. With 
the role of the Commission being seen as quite limited in its remit throughout 
the project on responsibility, the newly unified Union will perhaps opt for these 
new dedicated international actors to develop the role of the Union. The role 
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of the Commission was limited throughout this work to comments only on the 
previously Community aspect of the Union’s action. These new actors represent 
a newly unified external identity and would be capable of responding on behalf 
of the EU as a whole. It will be interesting to see what role these new institu-
tions will take on in areas such as interaction with the ILC as compared to the 
Commission. Perhaps they may be able to pursue the influence of the Union 
further. It may have more significance, however, for the internal dynamics of 
the EU in terms of who represents the Union and acts as its voice internation-
ally. 
Overall the changes brought in by Lisbon are positive in moving the devel-
opment of the EU’s external legal identity further forward. While the work of the 
EU within the ILC shows that it was clearly able to garner a role for itself and 
represent itself internationally, with certain limitations this was only able to go 
so far. Much of what has been discussed in this paper is, inevitably, based on 
speculation and interpretation on the influence exerted by the Commission. It 
is clear that it was able to have some impact, which in itself is significant. This 
was an influence that was limited, however, and it was always going to be 
within the limited remit of the Commission and also the limited perspective of 
the ILC on this project. Perhaps the changes brought in by Lisbon may show 
some significant steps in pushing this potential for such an international role 
further forward. It has not taken radical initial steps in this area, however, it has 
continued work that began a long time ago. Ultimately, the changes brought in 
by Lisbon have sought to progress the external role of the Union, but they have 
not changed the unique nature of the EU and the interaction that exists between 
the Union and its Member States. If anything, the new institutional arrangements 
and the increased international commitments have created an even more com-
plex arrangement. 
Ultimately Lisbon has not fundamentally changed the nature of the EU and 
the continued involvement of its Member States. The continued importance of 
the State and the way in which international entities are structured and designed 
around states, means that in spite of the continued push of the Union towards 
increased international representation, this is restricted. Ultimately, this is not 
a development of the Union towards the existence of a State. The changes 
brought in by Lisbon push the EU towards an increased international identity 
but not without raising futher complex questions in terms of its competence, 
role and relationship with its Member States. The continued role of Member 
States with the Union means that the new ideas brought in by Lisbon are not 
entirely straightforward. The new institutional arrangements, for example, do 
not necessarily result in a clear and distinct external identity for the Union. 
7. CONCLUSION
While the changes brought in by Lisbon will certainly assist in promoting the 
EU as a global actor, it is argued that the way in which this is really being 
achieved is from developments that have been much longer-standing. State-
ments made by the European Commission providing genuine impact upon the 
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development of an area of ‘pure’ international law gives some hint as to the 
potential of the EU as an autonomous actor. The development of the EU as a 
global actor in its own right, distinct from its Member States, has been develop-
ing since the early 1990s. Generally speaking, international organisations and 
their relationships with Member States have a complex idea of autonomy if the 
organisation involves a supranational element. This is certainly the case for 
the EU.
Despite the changes made at Lisbon which point to a greater capacity of 
the EU to be an international actor in its own right, the way in which the EU 
acts at the international level will continue to have a strong link to its Member 
States. On the substance of the ILC’s project itself – that of responsibility - the 
question will continually arise as to whether x or Y action is that of the or-
ganisation or of the Member State(s). The contribution of the EU to the work 
of the ILC has affected the ILC’s work and should be regarded as a success 
on the part of the EU’s external identity, as well as a necessary pre-cursor to 
any developments in external activities where responsibility is likely to be an 
important consideration. One should not be surprised that the contributions by 
Member States may on occasion differ from those submitted by the Commis-
sion on behalf of the EU, since after all, the formation of an EU external iden-
tity does not depend on the full and unanimous agreement of all the Member 
States on specific issues. It is highly unlikely that the Member States would all 
come to one view (whether on the responsibility of international organisations 
or another issue entirely) with the EU and its institutions holding an opposing 
view. Therefore, it appears that a ‘middle way’ exists: though the views of the 
EU as an independent actor and the Member States may on occasion differ, 
the latter are (at least in general sense) supportive of the progression towards 
the EU becoming more significant as an international actor. In the area sur-
rounding the ILC, at least, there has been a general acceptance of the EU 
voicing its opinions and in beginning to contribute to and help to shape the 
development of international legal principles.
